SOEKARNO SPREEKT MET HATTA EN SJAHIR

'42 werd gevoerd, liet Soekarno zich kort voor '65 uit, nl. in zijn gesprekken met Cindy Adams. Sjahrir schreef over het gesprek in zijn in '49 in Amerika gepubliceerd boek Out of Exile en Hatta in zijn memoires die in het jaar van zijn dood, 1980, in het Indonesisch en een jaar later in het Engels (in Singapore) gepubliceerd werden.

Van Soekarno vernam Cindy Adams het volgende:

'I went to the home of Hatta and we had our first tactical meeting. 'You and I have gone through a deep quarrel period', I said. 'Although there was a time we may not have loved each other, we now have a job far bigger than either of us. Differences in term of party or strategy no longer exist. Today we are one. United in the common struggle.'

'Agreed', declared Hatta.

We shook hands solemnly.

... Along with Sjahir, the only other person present, plans for future operations were laid swiftly. It was agreed we would function on two levels. On the surface openly and underground secretly. Each level to accomplish tasks the other could not.

'To gain political concessions in terms of military training and administrative jobs for our people, we must make an appearance of collaboration', I said.

'Obviously your power is with the masses', outlined Hatta, 'so you will have to work on the surface.'

'Correct. You will assist me, since you are too well-known a nationalist to work underground.'

'That leaves me', suggested Sjahir, 'to work underground and organize radio monitoring and other secret operations.'

Sjahir schreef het volgende:

'On the day of his arrival Sukarno², one of his trusted confidents, Hatta, and I met at Hatta's house to discuss the general situation. It appeared that Sukarno had been strongly affected by the Japanese successes. Evidently he had also been treated rather roughly in Sumatra by the Japanese. He regarded them as pure fascists, and felt that we must use the most subtle countermethods to get around them, such as making an appearance of collaboration. He furthermore considered the future to be far from promising, because he thought the war with Japan would last at least ten years. I presented the thesis that the war would be much shorter, and we must therefore develop our revolutionary aims. Neither he nor Hatta opposed this, and we agreed that they should do everything legally possible to give the nationalist struggle a broader legal scope, and at the same time secretly support the revolutionary resistance. We realized that the Japanese would try to capitalize on Sukarno's popularity for propaganda purposes, and we agreed that political concessions from the Japanese for the nationalists must be pressed for in return.

1 Cindy Adams: Sukarno, p. 173. ² Sjahir noemt hem 'Rachman' en Hatta 'Hafil'.